INTRODUCTION
Within the social sciences, the measurement of age, age structuring, and the life course must be considered within the context of three very different debates and problem areas. First, it is related to the more general problem of how the lives of individuals are connected to the development and change of larger social 233 0360-0572/97/0815-0233$08.00 collectives, of societies as a whole, and to the course of history (Elder 1996 , Mayer 1986 ). Second, it is related to the interaction of biological, psychological, and social aspects of individual development (Baltes et al 1996) . And third, it is related to a lively debate on the social construction of time (Nowotny 1989) . We must limit our discussion to a select number of issues within these three areas, guided primarily by decisions about the importance of certain concepts and measures for empirical research.
The measurement of age, age structuring, and the life course has become more problematic as the study of human lives has moved away from global images and theoretical categories toward more detailed analyses and explanations. Over the last century, everyday ideas about what constitutes the "normal biography" have become less clear. While we have little problem conjuring up images about the life of a Yorkshire coal miner or Iowa farmer, our images about the majority of lives in contemporary society seem to lack the same degree of clarity. Our scientific treatment of the life course must allow for the heterogeneity, discontinuity, and contingency that exists in present-day societies.
Earlier notions of the life cycle, life span, or life course were at least in principle based on holistic conceptions of human lives (O'Rand & Krecker 1990 ). The dominant theme was borrowed from biology: maturation and growth, followed by decline and regression. Only as a minor subtopic did the idea of lifelong development, whether actual or potential, surface (Baltes et al 1996) . As the study of human lives became more elaborate, sociological treatments were differentiated from those of biology and psychology; and even sociological treatments were segmented into a number of specialties (e.g. sociology of youth, sociology of old age, educational and occupational sociology, demography, and family studies). The challenge now lies in moving away from this fragmentation to a truly integrative study of the life course.
Chronological age, a property of individuals, may stand as a proxy for biological maturation, psychological development, membership in larger social categories (e.g. cohort), or life stage or phase. Age structuring refers to the fact that every society uses age in important ways, and the experiences, roles, and statuses of individuals are often tied to age (Kertzer 1989) . And the concept of the life course refers to the way in which social institutions shape and institutionalize individual lives in the interconnected domains of education, family, and work (Mayer & Tuma 1990) . Thus, educational trajectories, employment histories and occupational careers, and family and residential histories in part compose the life course. The life course might be understood as an objective "biography," though the term biography has increasingly been used in a more narrow sense, and is usually understood to be the subjective interpretation and construction of the life course by individuals themselves (Bertaux & Kohli 1984) .
While birth and death dates mark an individual's historical presence, the concept of cohort is reserved for an aggregate of individuals anchored together in historical time (normally defined on the basis of birth year). It is ultimately used as a basis for searching for common collective properties (or "cohort effects") brought about by the fact that historical events and conditions may impinge similarly on a cohort as they grow up, grow old, and die. In this chapter, unfortunately, we are unable to treat the problems associated with conceptualizing and measuring cohort. For a general introduction, interested readers might consult Ryder's (1965) classic paper on the concept of cohort, and Rosow's (1978) classic paper on the measurement of cohort.
So while the life course can be viewed as an event history of a single individual, it can also be viewed at aggregate level (e.g. as something shared by a cohort), as a property of cultures themselves, and as something that can be compared across historical periods or between nation-states.
We first review the critical concepts of, and measurement strategies associated with, age and age structuring-including a discussion of different types of age, subjective age identification, age norms and age expectations, critical life events, life phases, and life review. We then discuss state-of-the-art methods for measuring the life course, especially through life history and event matrices, and we close the chapter with some comments on the organization, analysis, and modeling of data.
MEASURING AGE AND FORMS OF AGE STRUCTURING
Age is one of the most primary social and cultural categories. Age usually operates interdependently with sex, and both age and sex are universal categories (LaFontaine 1978 , Linton 1942 , Parsons 1942 . Age and sex serve as important dimensions in both cognition and social structure. Cognitively, they function as convenient categories for the mapping of social and cultural expectations about life experiences and roles. The categories of age and sex are also of importance to the individual personality, particularly where self-identification and self-perceptions are concerned. In social structure, the categories of age and sex are common dimensions by which institutions are organized (e.g. aspects of our familial, educational, and occupational institutions are organized by age and sex).
As we mentioned earlier, age structuring refers to the fact that every society "has a distinctive way of dealing with age and, accordingly, that roles are in some ways age-linked" (Kertzer 1989, p. 5) . Age structuring can be formal, at the level of social structure and social institutions, where key concepts have included "cohorts, roles, and age strata, and their relationship to political, economic, kinship, and other social systems and historical changes in these systems" (Kertzer 1989, p. 6 AGE STRUCTURING AND GENDER Most researchers have assumed that age structuring, whether formal or informal, may be quite different for men's and women's lives, given that "the very division by gender is in itself conditioned by age structuring, with the salience of gender distinctions dependent on age" (Kertzer 1989, p. 12) . Similarly, Hagestad (1991) has noted that anthropological work on transitions has suggested that men and women may attach different social meanings to age, and that men and women may use different guidelines to measure the progress of their lives. For example, a long anthropological tradition focuses on rites de passage-rites that structure movement through lifetime by age and sex, and provide a means by which roles are assigned and resources are allocated (Benedict 1938 , Glaser & Strauss 1974 , van Gennup 1908 . Given that men's and women's lives are often thought about and experienced differently, our measures must be sensitive to these differences. AGE STRUCTURING ALONG OTHER SOCIAL DIMENSIONS Population-level behavioral patterns often show that the way the life course is actually experienced goes hand-in-hand with social location. The most prominent social dimensions in the literature on the demography of life-course events and transitions include sex (as discussed above), cohort/age, race/ethnicity, and social class (education, occupation, income, or some combination). While most scholars recognize that multiple definitions of the life course may emerge along various social dimensions, little empirical work has examined this variability, particularly at the level of subjective experience (Fry 1990) . As a result, researchers should continue to describe and explain these multiple definitions and experiences, and our measures must allow for these complexities.
AGE STRUCTURING AND LIFE SPHERES In most Western societies, many institutions are formally organized by age to some degree. For example, primary and secondary educational institutions are heavily age-graded (Angus et al 1988) . Similarly, work institutions often structure prospects for promotion by age and seniority (Lashbrook 1996 , Lawrence 1996 , Rosenbaum 1984 , and retirement policies and benefits are often structured around age (Henretta 1994 , Kohli 1994 .
The degree of both formal and informal age structuring may vary by life sphere. For example, it has been argued that age is more salient in the economic and political spheres than it is in the family sphere (for further explication of this debate, see Settersten & Hagestad 1996b) . Nonetheless, because lives are lived in multiple spheres, and because these spheres are often experienced in dramatically different ways, our measures must be sensitive to these differences. AGE STRUCTURING ACROSS CULTURES Project A.G.E., a cross-cultural research project headed by anthropologists Fry and Keith, is devoted to studying the meaning of age and aging in a variety of cultures, including seven communities on four continents (Hong Kong; Swarthmore, Pennsylvania; Momence, Illinois; Blessington, Ireland; Clifden, Ireland; the pastoral Herero of Botswana, South Africa; and the !Kung Bushmen, of Botswana, North Africa). Project A.G.E. researchers have found that chronological age has the strongest salience in communities that are part of modern, industrialized societies. In the least industrialized communities, especially among the !Kung Bushmen and those in rural Clifden, Ireland, questions about age make little sense to respondents (Keith et al 1994) .
This example speaks to the fact that researchers must be sensitive to crosscultural differences in how the life course is conceptualized, the assumptions they make about (or even impose upon) a given culture and, in turn, the ways in which age and aspects of the life course are measured.
Similarly, there is a great deal of cross-national variation in the degree to which age rules and age preferences are embedded within laws and social policies, as well as in the organization of social institutions that are connected to the state (Cain 1976 , Eglit 1985 , Neugarten 1982 . For example, in many countries rights and responsibilities are explicitly structured by chronological age. Examples of these rights and duties include age regulations around voting, driving, drinking, working (especially with regard to child labor), marrying, compulsory school, or seeking public offices. Eligibility for pensions, social services, or social insurance are also often dictated by age. Many of the discussions about legal ages center around questions of how soon in life individuals should be granted adult rights and obligations, or how late in life these rights and obligations should be retained (Cain 1976) .
General references to age-related categories without clearly specified ages are also common in legislation (e.g. "minors," "the elderly") (Cain 1976) . As Mayer & Schoepflin (1989, p. 200) have noted, "age groups are a favorite way of dividing up social problems," and larger age groups are often targeted for service bracketing.
These studies indicate that the state and many of its policies often rely on, and even create, conceptions of the life course. A critical examination of the state and its policies may provide further insights about the ways in which age, age structuring, and the life course are treated in a society. AGE STRUCTURINGAND NEWTIMEBUDGETS FOR THELIFE COURSE Researchers have begun to explore the ways in which the demography of an aging society, particularly increases in longevity, may have changed the nature of family and social life (Hagestad 1988 , Riley 1986 , Uhlenberg 1980 . For example, roles have been prolonged, the sequencing of roles over lifetime has become more varied and complex, and family relationships have the potential to become more active and intense (Riley 1986) . Similarly, Hagestad (1991, p. 25) and others have suggested that historical change along key demographic dimensions (life expectancy, mortality, fertility, nuptiality) has led to new "time budgets of adulthood," where the average number of years spent in various work and family roles has dramatically increased (Andersen 1985 , Gee 1987 , Watkins et al 1987 . However, from an empirical standpoint, we still have much to learn about the ways in which family and social life have specifically been transformed by these new demographic parameters, and our measures of age, age structuring, and the life course must take these parameters into account.
Measuring Different Types of Age
Research on aging and the life course hinges upon the effective measurement of age. As Bytheway (1990) notes, somewhere in the process of doing our research the questions "How old are you?" or "When where you born?" must be asked. But apart from error (e.g. difficulty remembering one's age or date of birth) or deception (e.g. intentionally misrepresenting one's age or birthdate) on the part of a respondent, the measurement of chronological age seems relatively straightforward. Chronological age can be measured in a number of ways, ranging in level of specificity-it can be expressed in days, months, or years. When the question is "How old are you?", the information gathered is normally expressed in "completed years." Of course, the same basic information is obtained with the question "What is the date of your birth?", but Bytheway (1990) reminds us that this question is quite different from the question "How old are you?" First, date of birth relates to a past event, while age is instead a current characteristic. Second, date of birth remains the same throughout life, while age is, of course, always changing. And third, complete birthdate (in month-day-year) is more precise. If only birthyear is asked, the calculation of age is likely to involve some rounding error. Some researchers have even asked both questions, but at separate points in the data-gathering process, as a consistency check. Jolicoeur and colleagues (1988) even make a distinction between postnatal age, measured from the day of birth, and total age, measured from the day of conception (obtained by correcting postnatal age with average duration of pregnancy, 0.75 years).
These examples serves as important reminders that we must ask ourselves why age is being measured and how it will be used; answers to these questions will dictate the best format for measuring age. Regardless of how it is operationalized, age is often the most powerful piece of information about an individual (Schroots & Birren 1988) .
At the same time, we know that chronological age itself is an "empty" variable-we rarely assume that it is age itself that causes a behavior; instead, it is whatever age presumably indexes that is thought to be important. For example, age is often used as a predictor of an individual's physical and emotional maturity, of an individual's readiness to assume certain responsibilities, or even of the probability that an individual will experience various medical or social problems (Chudacoff 1989 , Fry 1986 ). Still, researchers often give little thought to what exactly it is that age indexes, and they often do not spend enough time specifying the mechanisms through which age plays a role in the models they develop and test. In addition, researchers should think more critically about whether the things we hope to index by using age might instead be measured more directly, or about the conditions under which age is a relevant dimension to begin with (Ward 1984) .
Similarly, tests of age differences are often tests of arbitrarily-defined age brackets, sometimes into very broad bands (e.g. 55-74, 85+), or into smaller 5-or 10-year bands. Ironically, all of the care taken to measure age accurately is lost when these brackets are constructed. Worse still, researchers habitually break down their data in this way without compelling rationale. Why are a particular set of age brackets meaningful? And why we should expect to find important differences along these divisions? We must also begin to think more critically about the circumstances under which we should "hold age constant" in our analyses, rather than routinely control for age without justification.
However, as people grow older, and as variability among similarly-aged individuals increases over the life course (Dannefer 1987), chronological age may become less useful as an index. As a result, Birren and colleagues (Birren & Cunningham 1985 , Schroots & Birren 1988 suggest that alternative, and more specific, measures of age must be developed, measures that are more sensitive to individual differences. Birren & Cunningham (1985, p. 8) , for example, discuss three distinct kinds of age: 1. biological age, which is defined by an individual's "present position with respect to his [or her] potential life span. Thus, an individual's biological age may be younger or older than his [or her] chronological age"; 2. social age, which is defined by an individual's "roles and habits with respect to other members of the society of which he is a part. An individual may be older or younger depending on the extent to which he shows the age-graded behavior expected of him by his particular society or culture"; and 3. psychological age, which is defined by the "behavioral capacities of individuals to adapt to changing demands."1 Birren and his colleagues argue that while psychological age is clearly tied to biological and social ages, psychological age is a larger concept and includes the "use of adaptive capacities of memory, learning, intelligence, skills, feelings, motivations, and emotions for exercising behavioral control or self-regulation."
Birren suggests that these three types of age are highly independent from one another, except, perhaps, at their boundaries. While Birren's typology is useful for explicating the concept(s) of age, he and his colleagues offer little detailed advice on how these different types of age might be measured, except to say that the measurement of biological age would involve the "assessment of functional capacities of vial or life-limiting organ systems," while the measurement of social age would involve "such aspects as the individual's type of dress, language habits, and social deference to other persons in leadership positions" and the social institutions to which an individual belongs. (Some of what Birren describes as "social age" is discussed below in the section Measuring Age Norms and Age Expectations). To our knowledge, most of the discussion about biological, social, and psychological age has been conducted at a conceptual level, and few studies have attempted to measure and empirically validate these three types of age and their independence.
In an earlier discussion, Neugarten & Hagestad (1976, p. 36 ) also remind us that chronological age is often a poor indicator of biological, social, or psychological age. First, there are important individual differences in development. As such, age is only a "rough indicator" of an individual's status along biological, social, or psychological dimensions. Second, age is "only meaningful in relational terms, as in signifying that one is younger or older than someone else, closer or farther from birth or death, or in marking progress compared to other persons in one's reference group." Finally, chronological age is "meaningless unless there is knowledge of the particular culture and of the social meaning [s] attached to given chronological ages." Despite these problems, Neugarten & Hagestad (1976) argue that chronological age is "an indispensable index." Clearly, chronological age has convenient and practical uses as an administrative and normative gauge-it is an easily measured, objective, and universal attribute. As a result, it has become a prominent criterion for classifying and 1Schroots & Birren (1988) also review an additional type of age: fInctional age. Functional age is defined in terms of an individual's ability to adapt to his or her environment. Functional age may exist as a fourth type of age in its own right, and an individual's capacity for functioning in daily life could be understood through measures such as biological, psychological, and social age. Another conceptualization is that functional age may exist as a subdimension of each of the three types of age discussed earlier-leading to a specialized conception of biological, psychological, or social age defined in terms of functional criteria. ordering society. Similarly, Birren & Cunningham (1985, p. 12) suggest that "because age is such a powerful index, it will probably always be used to classify data while we are en route to explanations using variables other than the mere ages of individuals."
Subjective Age Identification
Research on subjective age identification examines how old a person feels, into which age group he or she categorizes him or herself, or how old one would like to be, regardless of one's actual age. This has been a lively tradition since the 1960s. As an earlier review by Cutler (1982) notes, subjective age is typically measured with a single item phrased something like: "Do you feel that you are: young, middle-aged, old, or very old?" (e.g. Markides & Boldt 1983) . Across studies, of course, there are slight variations in the item stem or in the number and type of response categories. In many gerontological studies, subjective age identification is restricted to whether an individual defines himself or herself as "old" or "very old." Often, this type of age is referred to as identity age.
Along these lines, Barak & Stern (1986) further delineate four aspects of identity age based on Kastenbaum and associates' (1972) Goldsmith & Heiens (1992) have recommended that the 19 1Os and 1990s decades might also be added if appropriate for the sample. Together, these four dimensions are labeled cognitive age (Barak & Stern 1986) .
Other popular measurements strategies move away from identification with a larger age group, and instead ask for a more specific age response. The original version of Kastenbaum and colleagues' (1972) "Ages of Me" instrument elicited specific ages. For example, another version offeel age is simply: "How old do you feel?" or "What age do you feel on the inside?" (Underhill & Cadwell 1983; also see Cremin 1992 , Thompson 1992 . Similarly, desired age is also easily asked: "What age would you most like to be?".
In studies of comparative or relative age identification, respondents are normally asked whether they feel older, the same, or younger than most other people their chronological age. Here, the comparison is between oneself and other similarly-aged people. In addition, few investigators have examined a version of comparative age that keeps the comparison internal; that is, whether an individual feels older, the same, or younger than his or her chronological age (e.g. Baum & Boxley 1983) .
In most research studies, these various types of subjective age are often then compared to an individual's actual chronological age. In doing so, even more types of age may result (for examples, see Barak [1987] , Barak & Gould [1985] ). Besides chronological age, other correlates of subjective age have been considered, the most popular being physical health, emotional health, gender, race and ethnicity, marital status, social participation, socioeconomic status, and retirement status (see reviews by Barak & Stern 1986 , Baum & Boxley 1983 , Montepare 1991 , Montepare & Lachman 1989 .
All of the measures described above are self-perceived ages-they ultimately reference the subjective ages of an individual him-or herself. One might also consider other-perceived age, or the age status(es) of individuals as evaluated by others (e.g. Lawrence 1974 ). The important point here is that this body of research generally does not anchor age in simple chronological terms, but it instead attempts to ground age at a phenomenological, subjectively experienced, level.
Measuring Age Norms and Age Expectations
Elementary, ascriptive categories often take on complex social meanings (e.g. influencing attitudes, behaviors, language), and age is no exception. For excellent reviews, see Hagestad (1990) , Hagestad & Neugarten (1985) , Keith et al (1994) , and Neugarten & Hagestad (1976) .
Age is one of the most salient social and cultural dimensions, and this salience may be reflected in informal age norms and expectations that govern behavior. In terms of sociological theory, (age) norms are prescriptions or proscriptions about behavior in the form of "should" and "should not"; they are supported by consensus; and they are enforced through various mechanisms of social control, particularly social sanctions-positive, to keep people "on track," and negative, to bring straying individuals "back into line" (Berger 1963 , Blake & Davis 1964 , Gibbs 1965 .
Assumptions about the salience of age, and the power of age norms, underlies much research and writing on the life course. Yet a great deal of "conceptual ambiguity and theoretical uncertainty" surrounds the terms "age norm" and "age-normative" in the life-course literature (Hagestad 1990, p. 160) . Common uses of these terms range from (a) statistical age norms (descriptions of statistical regularity in the timing of life events and transitions in the larger population or for subgroups of the population), to (b) optimal age norms (collective notions about the "best," "ideal," or "preferred" ages to experience various life transitions), to (c) prescriptive and proscriptive age norms (collective, shared expectations about when certain transitions "should" or "should not" occur, respectively).
While a handful of studies have intended to examine the presence of informal age "norms," their use and measurement of the concept "norm" has overlooked its core prescriptive or proscriptive essence. Most investigators have used the term "norm" either in the statistical or optimal senses described above, even though the prescriptive/proscriptive most fully-captures the essence of normative. Along these lines, Marini (1984) has criticized past research on age ''norms,' arguing that researchers have not actually measured social norms but have instead focused on the "ideal" and "preferred" domains. Researchers who have conducted their work at the "optimal" level have often assumed that notions about what is "best," "ideal," or "preferred" are synonymous with notions about what "should" or "ought to" be. Similarly, when demographers find regularity in life-course patterns at a population level, they often believe that the regularity reflects, and is driven by, cultural age prescriptions orproscriptions. Hogan (1985, p. 70) , for example, has argued that "in the United States, the appropriate ages for events are [not well-specified], but the statistical regularities in the timing of events are suggestive of underlying [informal] norms." Marini (1984) , however, has noted that behavior that is "statistically regular" may not be "normative," just as behavior that is "statistically irregular" may not be "non-normative."
The pioneering work of Neugarten and her colleagues at the University of Chicago during the late 1950s and early 1960s explored age "norms" and age "constraints." Two of the instruments that were used in their Kansas City Study of Adult Life are most relevant here: "Timetables for Men and Women" and the "Age Norm Checklist." The 11-item "Timetables for Men and Women" instrument generally asks respondents what they think the best age is for accomplishing a variety of transitions (e.g. "What do you think is the best age for a man to marry?" "What do you think is the best age for most people to leave home?"). For these timetable items, respondents give either a specific age or a small age band. Consensus was measured as the proportion who cite an age (or ages) within a short age span. Depending on the breadth of responses given for any particular item, the age span used for calculating consensus for that item ranged anywhere from 2 to 15 years; their approach was to select a band that "produced the most accurate reflection of the consensus that existed in the data."
The 48-item "Age Norm Checklist" asks whether respondents "approve of, feel favorable" or "disapprove of, feel unfavorable" about a variety of behaviors at different ages (e.g. "A woman who wears bikini on the beach-when she's 45; when she's 30; when she's 18" or "A man who buys himself a red sports car-when he's 60; when he's 45; when he's 25"). Responses are then scored to "reflect the degree of refinement with which the respondent makes age discriminations," with higher scores indicating greater age constraint.
One article in particular, Neugarten, Moore, & Lowe (1965) , has become the single standard citation as the classic study of informal age norms. These investigators have been criticized, though, for posing most of their questions at the optimal level (asking about the "best" age to accomplish various transitions) rather than the prescriptive level (the age one "should" or "ought to" experience major life transitions), and for not actually examining whether social sanctions or other consequences are thought to exist for violating these optimal-age timetables (Marini 1984) . However, they have examined whether respondents ''approve" or "disapprove" of persons of different ages engaged in a variety of more micro-level, lifestyle-related behavior (as discussed above).
Later, Passuth & Maines (1981) essentially replicated Neugarten's approach, and their conference paper is often cited as a follow-up to Neugarten, Moore, & Lowe's (1965) classic study. The work of Fallo-Mitchell & Ryff (1982) , Plath & Ikeda (1975) , Zepelin et al (1987) , Gee (1990) , Peterson (1996) , and Settersten & Hagestad (1996a 1996b has also used Neugarten's items in some capacity, though these studies have improved upon some of the original items (e.g. creating items about work for women that parallel previous items asked only about men; or splitting single items that asked about "people" into two separate items about men and about women), added new items (e.g. returning home) and eliminated others, added follow-up questions, altered scoring strategies, or varied research and sampling designs.
For additional information on research instruments related to age norms and expectations, readers might also consult an earlier review by Hagestad (1982) . Hagestad's review covers other seminal instruments, including Wood's (1972) "Age-Appropriate Behavior" (which asks 41 questions about the age at which a person is old enough to do various things, or the age at which a person is too old to do other things) and Bultena & Wood's (1969) "Normative Attitudes Toward the Aged Role" (which asks 8 questions about whether it is proper for older men, women, or couples to engage in a various activities).
Another body of research has examined the images associated with people of different ages, especially images about personality traits and characteristics. The most prominent of these instruments were part of Hagestad's (1982) compilation, including Hickey & Kalish's (1968) "Perceptions of Adults" (which prompts young respondents to give the ages that they associate with people who are "mean or unkind," "lonely," or "busy"; people who "like children and young people," or people they like to help), Neugarten & Peterson's (1957) "Age Association Items" (a 34-item index that asks for the age that respondents associate with a variety of feelings or behaviors, such as "a man who gets the most pleasure from his children," "when a woman gets most pleasure from sex," "the prime of life for a man"), and Cameron's (1972 Cameron's ( , 1976 ) "Comparison of Age Groups" (which asks respondents to compare young, middle-aged, and old adults on dimensions of masculinity and femininity, and on dimensions of fun and happiness).
Along these lines, the recent work of Heckhausen and her colleagues (Heckhausen et al 1989 , Heckhausen & Baltes 1991 ) is also noteworthy. With the goal of examining perceptions of developmental gains and losses throughout adulthood, Heckhausen uses a checklist of 385 adjectives covering perceptions of the personality (e.g. "impulsive"), social (e.g. "friendly"), and intellectual (e.g. "ready-witted") characteristics of people of different ages.
Critical Life Events
Within the larger field of research on life events and transitions, there is a smaller body of work that focuses on "critical" or "stressful" events. This tradition begins most notably with Holmes & Rahe (1967) and their Social Readjustment Rating Scale (also sometimes referred to as the Schedule of Recent Events). Holmes & Rahe asked respondents to indicate whether they had recently experienced any number of 43 different events, ranging from events as major as "death of a spouse" or "jail term," to events as minor as a "vacation" or "minor violations of the law."
Many later inventories have essentially sought to improve upon Holmes & Rahe's earlier measure, normally expanding the scope of items, rewording existing items that are ambiguous, or altering the scaling procedures. These include the Life Events Inventory (Cochrane & Robertson 1973) , the PERI Life Events Scale (Dohrenwend et al 1978) , the Paykel Scale (Paykel et al 1971), the Life Experiences Survey (Sarason et al 1978) , and the Life Events Questionnaire (Chiriboga & Dean 1978 , Chiriboga 1984 . Other measures move away from major life events, and instead focus on everyday hassles (e.g. "concerns about owing money," "home maintenance") and uplifts (e.g. "daydreaming," "feeling healthy," "laughing") (Holahan et al 1984 , Kanner et al 1981 , Lewinsohn et al 1985 , Wagner et al 1988 . Many of these inventories have been used primarily with non-aged, and often clinical, populations.
To remedy the age bias of these inventories, several investigators have incorporated items that are more appropriate for elderly populations (e.g. "age discrimination," "trouble with Social Security"). These inventories include the Elders Life Stress Inventory (Aldwin 1992), the Geriatric Scale of Recent Life Events (Kahana et al 1982) , the Geriatric Social Readjustment Rating Scale (Amster & Krauss 1974), the Louisville Older Persons Event Scale (Murrell & Norris 1984) , the Small Life Events Scale (Zautra et al 1986), modified versions of the Schedule of Recent Events (Mensh 1983 , Wilson 1985 , and the Pleasant and Unpleasant Events Schedules (Teri & Lewinsohn 1982) . However, many of the items in these inventories weigh heavily toward declining physical and mental health (e.g. "loss of hearing or vision," "difficulty walking," "painful arthritis," "move to home for the aged"). Some measures also include events that happen to children or grandchildren (e.g. "child married," "death of a grandchild").
There are several problems often associated with these inventories. First, a very select set of the larger universe of possible events is sampled (as one might expect), but events that are more common for young adults, men, whites, and the middle class are over-represented. In addition, negative and undesirable events are over-represented, and "non-events" (events that are expected to happen, but never occur) are omitted. Some people are, of course, also never "at risk" to experience certain events (e.g. one cannot experience the death of a child if one has not become a parent).
Second, not all events are equally important, and the procedures used for weighting events varies dramatically between studies. Some investigators have developed weights using independent raters; others asked the respondents themselves to weight events subjectively; and still others derived weights empirically-using group mean ratings or regression techniques. Many have abandoned the complexities associated with weighting, and have opted to use no weights at all.
Third, there are problems associated with the reliability of recall over long time periods. However, most of the measures intend to tap events that have occurred within a limited span of time, usually within the last year. For those interested in the life course, though, the issue of recall is more problematic, since the unit of time becomes lifetime (or at least lifetime to the present day).
Fourth, a number of problematic assumptions run through this literature: (a) That life events cause psycho-social disturbance (rather than the other way around). (b) That the direction of change is almost always negative (in part, this reflects the fact that most inventories focus on negative rather than positive events). (c) That effects are primarily additive in nature (the greater the number of events experienced, the greater the impact), and (4) that the impact of life events is usually direct and short-term. Future work might better explore whether psycho-social states instead predispose individuals to experience a certain set of events; whether and under what conditions positive change might result from negative experiences; whether relationships of other functional forms (especially nonlinear) might also be operating; and whether and how the effects of events may be delayed, dissipate, or grow over time.
Fifth, researchers might better classify events along multiple dimensions (e.g. major versus minor; anticipated versus unanticipated; controllable versus uncontrollable; typical versus atypical; desirable versus undesirable; acute versus chronic). In addition, researchers might begin to gather information about the resources to which people have (or had) access as a means for coping with various events, especially those events deemed as "stressful."
Two measurement instruments stand out as exemplars: The Standardized Life Events and Difficulties Interview (SL), developed by Kessler & Wethington (1992) at the University of Michigan in the United States; and its predecessor, the Life Events and Difficulties Schedule (LEDS), developed by Brown and colleagues (Brown & Harris 1978) at Bedford College in England. The LEDS has been used in England, Europe, Canada, and Africa. Both schedules provide a very comprehensive understanding of severe life events, ongoing stresses and difficulties, and life turning points. The LS is a more structured version of the open-ended, semi-structured LES, and is more in line with conventional survey techniques. Both schedules, however, require intensive training of interviewers. The pilot version of the LS instrument is monumental (exceeding 200 pages), and is currently being validated against the original LEDS. Unlike many of the inventories cited earlier, Kessler & Wethington, and Brown and his associates, do not seek to develop composite measures of events.
A related approach is to focus on the plausible links between one or more specific life events and a specific outcome, usually one related to well-being (e.g. George 1989 , Krause 1991 , McLanahan & Sorensen 1985 .
For other discussions of the meaning and measurement of stressful life events, see Cohen (1988) , Inglehart (1991) , and Thoits (1983) . For discussions on later life in particular, see Chiriboga (1989 ), Ensel (1991 , and Murrell et al (1988) .
Measuring Life Phases
We now turn to a brief discussion of larger life phases-how individuals in a given society construct a "mental map of the life cycle" (Neugarten & Hagestad 1976) , dividing the span of time from birth to death into distinct categories.
An earlier review by Hagestad (1982) reviewed a number of measurement strategies which, with slight modifications, remain the most dominant approaches. Neugarten & Peterson's (1957) "Phases of Adulthood" instrument from the Kansas City Study of Adult Life is representative of these measures, asking "What would you call the periods of life, the age periods most people go through? At what age does each begin, for most people? What are the important changes from one period to the next, for most people?" For strategies of this sort, respondents are asked to provide their own divisions and labels.
Another common strategy is to provide respondents with predetermined labels and ask them to generate the age parameters they associate with those labels. Cameron's (1969) "Age Parameters" questions are good examples of this: Cameron asks for the ages at which "young adult," "middle-aged," "old," and "aged" begin. Similarly, Drevenstedt's (1976) "Onset of Adult Phases" questions ask for age parameters, but also make distinctions between men's and women's lives-asking for the ages at which a male becomes a "young man," a "middle-aged man," and an "old man," and the ages at which a female becomes a "middle-aged woman" and an "old woman." Some of Neugarten & Peterson's (1957) "Age Association Items" are in this format as well.
The simplest strategy has been to provide respondents with the label for the life phase and a number of preset response categories. The National Council on Aging's (1975) "Onset of Old Age" adopts this approach, asking "At what age do you think the average man becomes "old"? "Under 40 years, 40 to 44 years, 45 to 49 years, [etc, in 4-year brackets] 90 years or older." Respondents were also given the options of "Never," "It Depends," "When he stops working," "When his health fails," "Other," or "Unsure." A follow-up question asks respondents to give their reasons for choosing a particular age band. In addition, a similar series of questions were asked about women.
Anthropologists associated with Project A.G.E. developed an innovative strategy for examining perceptions of the life course (Keith et al 1994) : the "Age Game." Respondents are given a deck of cards that contain descriptions of various personae (e.g. "A male, high school graduate, single, is working, living with parents" or "A female, working, married, two children both of whom have recently married" or "A male, widowed, retired, living with adult children"), and are asked to sort the deck based on guesses about the ages of the people described on the cards. After respondents have finished the sorting process, they are asked: "What name would you give to the age-bracket or the age-group of the people you have placed in this pile? Are there any other words you might use to describe this general age group? Roughly, what is the age or range of ages in terms of years of the people described in this pile?"
Theorists and researchers have also relied on life stages or developmental phases as a favorite way of conceptualizing human lives from birth to death (e.g. Eisenstadt 1956 , Erikson 1980 . The differentiation of life phases has been seen as an historically emergent property of modern societies, beginning with "childhood," "adulthood," "old age" (Borscheid 1992 , Ehmer 1990 . Childhood was eventually differentiated into "early childhood," "youth and adolescence," and "post-adolescence." Adulthood was also segmented into "early adulthood," "mid-life," and "old age." Old age was split into the "young-old" and the "oldold" (Neugarten 1974) , or the "third and fourth ages" (Laslett 1991) . Note, however, that Neugarten's original formulation of young-old and old-old was meant to distinguish that proportion of the elderly population who "are relatively healthy, relatively affluent, relatively free from traditional responsibilities of work and family, and who are increasingly well-educated and politically active" from those who are not-regardless of their ages (Neugarten 1974, p. 187) . Over time, gerontological researchers have increasingly defined the young-old and old-old in purely chronological terms-with the young-old defined as those between 65 and 74, or between 65 and 84; and with the old-old defined as either those aged 75 or older, or aged 85 or older.
Another approach has been to divide the life course into a series of positions vis-a'-vis the welfare state: as non-recipients and non-contributors (e.g. children, housewives), contributors (e.g. the economically active), and recipients (e.g. elderly, unemployed, disabled, maternity leave) (Mayer & Schoepflin 1989) .
Researchers who have concentrated on the economic participation of males, and the functional requirements of capitalist societies, have described the "triangularization of life" (Smelser & Halpern 1978) and the "tripartition of the life course" (Kohli 1994) . That is, the life course is composed of three distinct segments, an early part devoted to education and training, a middle part devoted to work, and a final part devoted to retirement.
As a result, education-and work-related activities may mark the transition from one life phase to another. "Old age," for example, is often defined by eligibility rules for the receipt of pensions or Social Security benefits, or by the legal or actual retirement ages. However, as a measure of "old age," age at retirement entails a number of obvious problems. First, many older persons remain employed in some capacity after retirement, while others do not have gainful work from which to retire. Second, the receipt of pension payments and social security benefits may not coincide with age at retirement. Third, age at retirement tells us little about an individual's level of physical and mental functioning, degree of autonomy or dependency, or level of social participation. The distinction between the "young-old" and the "old-old" (cited above) has been prompted by the facts that: (a) average age at retirement has fallen markedly during the last decade, and is now between the ages of 55 and 60 in most advanced countries (Kohli 1994), (b) the upper end of the life span has extended, and (c) there is an enormous degree of variability in the functional ability of older persons at any given age (Maddox 1987) .
There are now several good examples of strategies for measuring the multidimensional process of aging using interview or survey methods (see Berkman et al 1993 , from the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Successful Aging; Baltes et al 1993, from the Berlin Aging Study). Nonetheless, we still do not have well-developed measures of the transition to dependency in old age. While measures related to Activities of Daily Living (ADL, IADL) capture declining abilities for self-care, these measures do not take support structures and social settings into account. In this area, measurement might be improved by adopting the logic of life course analysis (discussed later). For example, one might conceptualize the transition to dependency as a series of different states (e.g. first being unable to work, followed by the receipt of informal help, the receipt of formal help in the home, and institutionalization). The duration of time spent in these various states could then be used to better understand the course of this process.
Life Review and Life History
The continuity of subjective biographical identity, and of personality characteristics and behavioral dispositions, provides a sense of integrity in life. While individuals may engage in reminiscence and life review activities throughout the life course, these activities seem especially salient during middle and old age, functioning to bridge earlier and later segments of life (Erikson 1980 , Levinson 1986 , Neugarten 1968 , Staudinger 1989 .2 In addition to their research value, reminiscence and life review techniques are also popular therapeutic tools (e.g. Butler & Lewis 1982 , Coleman 1986 , deVries et al 1990 , Haight 1991 . Life review and reminiscence activities often help individuals achieve a sense of self-worth, coherence, and reconciliation with one's past; maintain perceptions of competence and continuity; and pass on one's cultural heritage and personal legacy (Wong & Watt 1991) .
The most common approaches to life review and reminiscence involve unstructured or semi-structured interviews. Interviews are usually conducted with individuals, but family and group sessions may be conducted as well (e.g. Botella & Guillem 1993 , Birren & Deutchman 1991 , deVries et al 1990 . Examples of key questions include "What do you see as important or significant in your life?" (Lewis 1971) , "What family members have had a major impact in shaping your life? Why?" (deVries et al 1990), "Describe three memories that you've been thinking about lately" (David 1990 ), "What were the most important events? What were the most difficult decisions?" (Tismer 1971) , "Tell something of your past that is most important to you-that is something that has had the most influence on your life" (Wong & Watt 1991) . Others have had revealing discussions centered around cherished objects (e.g. photographs, jewelry, books, paintings) (Sherman 1991) .
Other investigators have not examined the content of reminiscence, but have instead asked about their frequency or affective quality. For these purposes, Havighurst & Glasser's (1972) questions are commonly used: "Looking back over the last several weeks, would you say you have done a great deal, some, or very little reminiscing?" and "Would you most often characterize your reminiscence activities as most pleasant, pleasant, or unpleasant?"
Another interesting approach to life review is to ask a series of questions about life revision; that is, to ask respondents to identify what they would do differently if they had their lives to live over again. For example, DeGenova (1992) created a life revision index based on 35 questions with the stem "If you had your life to live over again, how much time would you spend ...", with the response categories being "much more, more, same, less, much less." The items in DeGenova's index cover 7 different life domains: family (e.g. "developing close relations with your children"), work (e.g. "worrying about your job"), 2Staudinger (1989) notes that while the terms "life review" and "reminiscence" are often used synonymously, they should be recognized as distinct. Reminiscence, Staudinger argues, is the simple recalling of life events, something that can be "triggered quite unwillingly by the reminiscer"; life review, on the other hand, involves the interpretation and evaluation of those events and often requires more "active engagement of the person who is reviewing his or her life" (p. 71). Life review, as Butler (1963, p. 67) reminds us, "is not synonymous with, but includes, reminiscence." friendships (e.g. "keeping up with good friends"), health (e.g. "taking good physical care of your body"), education (e.g. "pursuing your education"), leisure (e.g. "traveling"), and religion (e.g. "developing your spirituality"). Of course, additional depth could be gained through a series of follow-up questions on what exactly respondents would do differently, and why they would allot their time in new ways.
A related approach is to ask subjects to graph their lives. For example, Runyan (1980) and several earlier studies (Clausen 1972 , Pressey & Kuhlen 1957 gave respondents a graph with ages 5 through 40 calibrated on the horizontal axis, and personal morale (spanning from 0, or "rock bottom," to 9, "absolute tops") on the vertical axis. Respondents were asked to draw a curve indicating their degree of happiness in over those years, and were then asked to discuss the reasons for their ratings. Similarly, others have administered blank-grid life graphs with only 5-year age demarcations (from 0 through 80) on the horizontal axis, and have asked subjects the following question: "Can you visualize how your life could be put into a graph? That is, ups and downs, level periods, rises and declines, etc. Assuming that you live until at least 80 years of age, how do you think that a graph of your life will look?" (e.g. Back & Bourque 1970 , Bourque & Back 1977 , Back & Averett 1985 . Depending on the age of the subject and the age span of the graph, some subjects respond in terms of how they think their lives will unfold (prospectively), others in terms of how their lives actually did unfold (retrospectively), and still others provide a mix of both. While these graphs may be used with any age group, this method may be especially useful in research with middle-aged and aged respondents, particularly as a way to structure life review discussions or to gather life history data.
Readers interested in other applications of reminiscence and life review methods might consult two recent edited volumes by Haight & Webster (1995) and Hendricks (1995) . Life history methods, which are related to life review methods, are a primary means for collecting data on the life course. These methods are considered in detail in the next section.
MEASURING THE LIFE COURSE
As discussed in the introduction, the life course refers to the "social processes extending over the individual life span or over significant portions of it, especially [with regard to] the family cycle, educational and training histories, and employment and occupational careers. The life course is shaped by, among other things, cultural beliefs about the individual biography, institutionalized sequences of roles and positions, legal age restrictions, and the decisions of individual actors" (Mayer & Tuma 1990, p. 3).
SETIERSTEN & MAYER
Life trajectories, transitions, and events are central concepts in the study of the life course (Elder 1985) . The concept of the life trajectory, similar to that of a career, is long in scope, and refers to "a pathway defined by the aging process or by movement across the age structure" (Elder 1985, p. 31) . The individual life course is composed of multiple, interdependent trajectories (for example, work, family, and educational trajectories).
Trajectories are punctuated by a sequence of successive life events and transitions. Events and transitions are brief in scope, and refer to changes in state. However, an event is usually conceptualized as a relatively abrupt change, while a transition is usually conceptualized as a more gradual change. Transitions and events are always placed within a larger trajectory, and the trajectory gives them "distinctive form and meaning" (Elder 1985, p. 31) .
The concepts of timing, sequencing, duration, and spacing are often used to describe life events, transitions, and the characteristics of larger trajectories (Hagestad & Neugarten 1985) . Timing refers to the age at which given transitions occur in the life course. Sequencing refers to the order in which transitions are experienced over the life course. Duration refers to the length of time spent in any give state. Spacing refers to the amount of time between two or more transitions, the pace at which multiple transitions are experienced.
In addition to these basic concepts, the researcher must identify the life domains and state spaces to be measured. A natural and convenient way to do this is to structure data collection on activities in the domains of family (e.g. parents, siblings, spouses or partners, children), education and training (e.g. schools, training places, credentials), employment (e.g. employment contracts, occupational activities, firm membership, sector location), and residence and household (e.g. places of residence, household composition).
While these dimensions describe the primary activities across life, a more complete picture of the life course must also include more marginal periods and events-such as brief periods of training, second or part-time jobs, periods of unemployment or sickness (for examples, see Mayer & Bruckner 1989) .
Calendars, Life History Matrices, and Event Histories
Life history matrices plot life domains, and specific events and transitions within them, over time (Balan et al 1969 , Freedman et al 1988 , Frank & van der Burgh 1986 ; readers interested in working with archival data might consult a recent monograph by Elder et al 1994) . In life history matrices, the first column calibrates time, and the remaining columns specify domains and events of interest. The date an event began is indicated in the appropriate row, and its duration is then charted vertically. The advantage of this type of instrument is that activities in multiple life domains are simultaneously mapped onto one frame, and the relationships between them are easily seen. In addition, inconsistencies are easily detected and can be double-checked immediately with the respondent.
Many of these instruments are also easily self-administered. The great disadvantage of these measures is that little information can be noted in matrix cells (e.g. it is difficult to note detailed information about occupational titles). As a result, only a very crude and, in most cases, insufficient picture of the life course can be constructed using life history matrices.
A more adequate means for collecting data on life histories is exemplified by the Life History Questionnaire applied in six surveys of the German Life History Study (Mayer & Bruckner 1989) , which built upon the Norwegian Life History Study (Rogoff-Ramsoy 1973) . In developing this instrument, the goal was not only to extract monthly data for several life domains, but also to obtain a wide variety of contextual information on each state. For these purposes, complete event histories (from birth to the present) were collected in each life domain, beginning with the residential history. In the case of residential history, for example, data are gathered on every residential "state," including the month and year that mark the beginning and end points, the size and type of residence, geographic location, and the composition of household. The residential history is taken first because it provides a good anchor for the recollection of information on other trajectories. In a similar format, general schooling, occupational training, primary employment, secondary employment, and military service trajectories are charted and then reviewed for all periods that are unaccounted. Thus, the main content of these surveys becomes the life history itself (for theories, rationale, and applications, see Blossfeld et al 1991 , Mayer & Tuma 1990 .
In the German Life History Study, this technique was applied in both personal and computer-assisted telephone interviews with persons between the ages of 29 and 103 (Bruckner 1994) . It results in rich and accurate time-continuous data. Of course, there are high costs associated with interviewing time (in most cases, between 1.5 and 3 hours), the editing process (including return calls to respondents to clarify inconsistencies), and the training of interviewers and editing staff. When respondents agreed, their personal and telephone interviews were also audiotaped; those recordings were then used during the process of editing data. Shorter versions of this instrument are possible when either the number of life domains and/or the range of contextual variables are restricted.
Retrospective Versus Prospective Measurement Strategies
Although retrospective methods are often used in cross-sectional studies, the data itself, at least in principle, may approach that obtained by a sufficiently long panel study (that is, respondents are interviewed only once, but information is gathered on the entire life course). One-time retrospective surveys offer an excellent alternative to longitudinal designs, especially for those interested in the life course as a whole (Featherman 1980) . The most common problem associated with retrospective data concerns the accuracy and precision of recall (Dex 1991) . This criticism, however, applies to any kind of autobiographical data, regardless of research design.
When retrospective data are cross-checked against data from archival sources (e.g. registry, school, or firm records) some degree of inconsistency is likely to emerge. This incongruence is often taken as evidence that retrospective data are not completely reliable, even though archival data may be equally fallible. However, once common sources of error are known, these errors can be taken into account when research instruments are being designed; as a result, the amount of measurement error may be substantially reduced (Bruckner 1990 ). An advantage of most life history instruments is that they address complete histories in a systematic fashion, embedding events and transitions in both diachronic and synchronic life contexts.
Data on the life course can also be collected prospectively (e.g. in panel studies with multiple measurement points). For example, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the United States, the first major household panel, became the model for similar studies in Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Sweden. However, even panel designs are not exempt from problems associated with retrospective measurement (Featherman 1980) , since information is usually gathered on the period of time before the survey began, and on the period of time that elapses between measurement points. The major disadvantage of panel studies is, of course, that one must wait many years until a sufficient span of the life course can be described.
Readers interested in further discussion of issues related to data quality in longitudinal research might consult a recent edited volume by Magnusson & Bergman (1990) .
Data Organization and Analyses
Standardized, quantitative life histories from large samples have been collected since the late 1960s (Balan et al 1969 , Blum et al 1969 , Rogoff-Ramsoy 1973 . But it was not until the mid-1970s and early 1980s that adequate methods for data organization, retrieval, and analysis became available (e.g. Allison 1984 , Blossfeld et al 1989 , Courgeau & Lelievre 1992 , Flinn & Heckman 1982 , Griffin 1993 , Mayer & Tuma 1990 , Singer & Willett 1991 , Yamaguchi 1991 .
The recent sociology of the life course has almost accomplished its mission to show that lives are differentiated, event-related, and episodic, and must be examined and analyzed in a step-by-step piecemeal fashion. Descriptive techniques for survival data and stochastic models for discrete events in continuous time (known as hazard rate or event history models) have been shown to be especially useful in analyzing life history data. A major charge of critics has been that these methods atomize lives into unrelated transitions and episodes. In contrast, these critics have called for methods to better represent total trajectories with typologies (Abbott 1983 , Abbott & Forrest 1986 , Abbott & Hrycak 1990 , Chan 1995 . One technique in particular-"optimal matching," which seeks to unravel sequence patterns-has been proposed, but it remains to be seen whether it holds its promise.
In response, proponents of event-history methods have insisted that the position of their critics is doubly misleading: They argue that both trajectories and the richness of individual biographies can, in fact, be modeled well with event-history procedures. In addition, they suggest that typological approaches, especially those that seek to represent sequences, make inadequate use of the temporal character of the data, and are insufficient for covering the entire range of possible pathways in most empirical applications (Mayer 1986 , Mayer & Tuma 1990 ).
Readers interested in learning more about various techniques for analyzing longitudinal data, including the analysis of sequences, might consult a recent casebook of applications edited by Magnusson and colleagues (1991) .
CLOSING STATEMENT
We have argued that the measurement of age, age structuring, and the life course have become more problematic as the study of human lives has moved toward more detailed analyses and explanations. Our scientific treatment of the life course must allow for the heterogeneity, discontinuity, and contingency that exists in present-day societies. Earlier notions of the life cycle, life span, or life course, were at least in principle based on holistic conceptions of human lives. However, as the scientific treatment of human lives became more elaborate, our approaches became increasingly fragmented not only across academic disciplines, but also within them. Yet life-course research must address many different analytic levels if it is to be comprehensive. The challenge now lies in moving away from this fragmentation to a truly integrative study of the life course. Herein lies our paradox: As we seek to better understand the course of human lives in contemporary and ever-changing societies, the effective empirical measurement of its key concepts simultaneously becomes more pressing and more complicated. 
